Abstract. We show that the standard Gödel modal logics, as initially introduced by Caicedo and Rodriguez in [3, 4] , are not realized by the basic Gödel justification logics although being related by the forgetful projection.
The fundamental semantics of Gödel justification logics used here is the many-valued analogue of the classical Mkrtychev models [15] , called Gödel-Mkrtychev models. These extend the standard minimum t-norm based semantics for propositional Gödel logics as follows, where we denote the minimum t-norm by ⊙ and by ⊕ the maximum function, i.e. x ⊙ y = min{x, y} and x ⊕ y = max{x, y}. Precisely, a Gödel-Mkrtychev model is a structure M = E, e where (1) E : Jt × L J → [0, 1], (2) e : V ar → [0, 1], and which satisfies (i) E(t, φ → ψ) ⊙ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t · s, ψ) for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ, ψ ∈ L J , (ii) E(t, φ) ⊕ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t + s, φ) for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J .
We denote the class of all Gödel-Mkrtychev models by GM. We call a GM-model M = E, e crisp if both E and e only take values in {0, 1}.
For a GM-model M = E, e , we define its evaluation function | · | M : L J → [0, 1] as follows:
• |⊥| M = 0, • |p| M = e(p) for p ∈ V ar,
where we write ⇒ for the residuum (see e.g. [11] ) of ⊙, i.e.
x ⇒ y = y if x > y 1 otherwise for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. For the derived connective ¬, we obtain the following derived truth function ∼:
∼ x = 0 if x > 0 1 otherwise and for ∼∼ x, we also write ∼ 2 x. We may extend the evaluation to sets of formulas Γ ⊆ L J by setting |Γ| M = inf φ∈Γ {|φ| M }. We write M |= φ if |φ| M = 1 and M |= Γ if M |= φ for any φ ∈ Γ.
A GM-model M = E, e is called a (1) GMT-model if E(t, φ) ≤ |φ| M for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J , (2) GM4-model if E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J , (3) GMLP-model if (1) and (2), (4) GM45-model if (2) and ∼ E(t, φ) ≤ E(?t, ¬t : φ) for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J , (5) GMT45-model if (1) and (4) . Definition 1. Let C be class of GM-models. For Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L J , we say that Γ 1-entails φ in C, written Γ |= C φ, if for any model M ∈ C, if M |= Γ, then M |= φ.
The other standard semantics for classical justification logics defined by so called Fitting-models, see [7] , also extends to the fuzzy cases, see e.g. [8, 9, 16] .
We define the following proof systems for Gödel justification logic over L J based on Hájek's strongly complete Hilbert-style proof calculus for propositional Gödel logic given in [11] : Definition 2. The Hilbert-style calculus GJ 0 is given by the following axiom schemes and rules over L J :
By G, we denote the fragment without the axiom schemes (J) and (+). We then define the following axiomatic extensions of GJ 0 :
(1) GJ T 0 is the extension of GJ 0 by the scheme (F ) : t : φ → φ, (2) GJ 4 0 is the extension of GJ 0 by the scheme (!) : t : φ →!t : t : φ, (3) GLP 0 is the extension of GJ T 0 by the scheme (!), (4) GJ 45 0 is the extension of GJ 4 0 by the scheme (?) : ¬t : φ →?t : ¬t : φ, (5) GJ T 45 0 is the extension of GJ 45 0 by the scheme (F ).
Provability (possibly with assumptions) in such a Hilbert-style calculus S is defined as usual and denoted by the relation symbol ⊢ S .
Let GJ L 0 be one the previously introduced Gödel justification logics. We call a set CS of formulas of the form c in : · · · : c i1 : φ, n ≥ 1, where φ is an axiom instance of GJ L 0 , c i k ∈ C and such that if c in : · · · : c i1 : φ ∈ CS, then c i k : · · · : c i1 : φ for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a constant specification for GJ L 0 . A constant specification CS for GJ L 0 is called axiomatically appropriate if for every axiom instance φ of GJ L 0 , there is a constant c ∈ C such that c : φ ∈ CS and if c in : · · · : c i1 : φ, then c in+1 : c in : · · · : c i1 : φ for some constant c in+1 .
A constant specification CS for GJ L 0 is called total if c in : · · · : c i1 : φ ∈ CS for every n ≥ 1, i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ N and every axiom instace φ.
Given a constant specification CS for GJ L 0 , we define the logic GJ L CS as the extension of GJ L 0 by the rule (CS):
From c : φ ∈ CS, infer c : φ. We say that a Gödel-Mkrtychev model M = E, e respects a constant specification CS if E(c, φ) = 1 for every c : φ ∈ CS. Given a class of Gödel-Mkrtychev models C, we denote the subclass of all models respecting CS by C CS . A first important result on the Gödel-based systems is the lifting lemma as an analogue to the classical case.
Lemma 1 (Lifting lemma, P. [16] ). Let
and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for GJ L 0 . If {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊢ GJ L CS φ, then for any justification terms t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Jt, there is a justification term t ∈ Jt such that
A direct consequence of the lifting lemma is the internalization property for certain justification logics.
and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for GJ L 0 . Then if ⊢ GJ CS φ, then there is a t ∈ Jt such that ⊢ GJ CS t : φ.
The main theorem on Gödel justification logics used in this paper is the completeness theorem for the above systems and the Gödel-Mkrtychev models introduced before.
be the corresponding class of Gödel-Mkrtychev models for
On the modal side, we fix a necessity-based modal language L by
Before we concern ourselves with the concept of realizability, we present the standard Hilbert-style proof theoretic access to standard Gödel modal logics based on the work of Caicedo and Rodriguez in [3, 4] . We define the following Hilbert-style proof calculi in the language L : Definition 3. GK is given by the following axiom schemes and rules: (G): The axiom schemes of the calculus G.
We then define the following axiomatic extensions of GK :
(1) GT is the extension of GK by the axiom scheme (T ) : φ → φ, (2) GK4 is the extension of GK by the axiom scheme (4) : φ → φ, (3) GS4 is the extension of GT by the axiom scheme (4).
The notation of the rule (N ) is used to indicate that it may only be applied to pure theorems of the respective calculus if it is a proof with a set of assumptions.
In [4] , Caicedo and Rodriguez obtained completeness theorems for these logics together with a natural semantics defined over model classes of [0, 1]-valued Kripke models, called Gödel-Kripke models.
Justification logics are often presented relative to a given constant specification. It shall be noted that by the modal inference rule (N ) in all of the above systems, for every theorem θ, θ is a theorem as well. Thus, any candidate Gödel justification logic for realization of a corresponding standard Gödel modal logic has to have the internalization property.
In the following, for a given proof system S over a language L, we write T h S = {φ ∈ L | ⊢ S φ}.
Forgetful projection.
A natural projection from the explicit modal language L J to L is the one mapping every explicit modality "t :" to the unexplicit modality , called the forgetful projection. We define the forgetful projection operator • : L J → L formally by recursion on the structure of L J as follows:
Remark 2. For the various axioms of Gödel justification logics, we obtain the following forgetful projections:
Note, that the cases in (2) are instances of a propositional tautology, while (1), (3), (4) and (5) are instances of the various axioms of standard Gödel modal logic, all in the language of L .
The proof of the theorem is a straightforward induction on the length of the proof.
Realization fails without factivity
In the following, we concern ourselves with the non-realizability of the axiom scheme (Z). We approach this using a countermodel construction, where we for now require that the justification logics do not contain the factivity axiom scheme (F ).
For this, let T CS be the total constant specification for GJ 45 0 , and x ∈ (0, 1). We define the x-rooted provability model M x = E x , e x by e x (p) = x for any p ∈ V ar and
for any t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J . It is easy to see that for φ ∈ L J , we have |φ| Mx ∈ {0, x, 1}. We then first obtain the following:
Lemma 4. For any x ∈ (0, 1), M x is a GM45 TCS -model.
Proof. We verify the conditions: (1) We have ⊢ GJ 45T CS c : φ for any c : φ ∈ T CS. By definition, either φ is an axiom instance or φ = d : ψ ∈ T CS by downward closure. Either way ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ and thus we have E x (c, φ) = 1 for any such c : φ, i.e. M x respects T CS. (2) Let φ ∈ L J and t, s ∈ Jt. If E x (t, φ) ⊕ E x (s, φ) = x, then the claim is immediate. Thus suppose E x (t, φ) ⊕ E x (s, φ) = 1, i.e. per definition E x (t, φ) = 1 or E x (s, φ) = 1. In either case ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ and additionally ⊢ GJ 45T CS t : φ or ⊢ GJ 45T CS s : φ. Either way, by the axiom scheme (+) and the rule (M P ),
as well as ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ and ⊢ GJ 45T CS s : φ. By (M P ) and the axiom scheme (J), we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS ψ and
suppose E x (t, φ) = 1, then ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ and ⊢ GJ 45T CS t : φ. The latter implies ⊢ GJ 45T CS !t : t : φ by the axiom scheme (!) and (M P ), i.e. E x (!t, t : φ) = 1. (5) We always have E x (t, φ) ∈ {x, 1}, i.e. as x > 0 we always have ∼ E x (t, φ) = 0 and thus, for any φ ∈ L J and t ∈ Jt, we have ∼ E x (t, φ) ≤ E x (?t, ¬t : φ).
M x now serves as a counter model for realization instances of the modal axiom (Z).
Lemma 5. For any φ ∈ L J such that ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ and any t, s ∈ Jt:
Proof. Suppose ⊢ GJ 45CS ¬¬φ for φ ∈ L J and let t, s ∈ Jt as well as x ∈ (0, 1). As
we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ as otherwise ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ by (M P ). Thus, |t : φ| Mx = E x (t, φ) = x ∈ (0, 1).
As E x (t, φ) > 0, we have |¬¬t : φ| Mx = 1 by the semantical evaluation of ¬ by ∼. However, we have
as ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ. Thus, we have |¬¬t : φ → s : ¬¬φ| Mx = x < 1 and by Lem. 4 M x is a GM45 TCS -model. Per definition, we have
that is by Thm. 2:
By this lemma, for any formula for which its double-negation projection is not provable (or valid), there is no valid (realized) formula structured like the (Z)-axiom. As for e.g. any propositional variable p, its double negation is never provable, we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 6. For any constant specification CS for GJ
0 : (T h GJ CS ) • T h GK .
Proof. (T h GJ CS )
• ⊆ T h GK follows from Thm. 3. By the modal axiom (Z), ⊢ GK ¬¬ p → ¬¬p for p ∈ V ar, but as ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬p, for any t, s ∈ Jt:
by Lem. 5. Thus, by CS ⊆ T CS as all GJ 0 axiom schemes are also GJ 45 0 axiom schemes, we have ⊢ GJ CS ¬¬t : p → s : ¬¬p for any t, s ∈ Jt as if there would be a proof, this proof could be also carried out in GJ 45 T CS . Thus, there is no φ ∈ L J such that ⊢ GJ CS φ, i.e. φ ∈ T h GJ CS , and such that φ
By a similar proof, we have the following.
Theorem 7. For any constant specification CS for GJ 4 0 : (T h GJ 4CS )
• T h GK4 .
In fact, GJ 4 CS does not even realize GK , as the problem remains with axiom (Z). However, of course the forgetful projection of the introspection axiom scheme t : φ →!t : t : φ is not a theorem of GK , i.e. (T h GJ 4CS )
• ⊆ T h GK . It also important to note that it is crucial for the proof of Thm. 5 that Gödel-Mkrtychev models are manyvalued as x ∈ (0, 1) is necessary. Making M x crisp by moving x to 1 makes any instance of ¬¬t : φ → s : ¬¬φ valid in M x and moving x to 0 makes at least some instance of ¬¬t : φ → s : ¬¬φ valid in M x for any φ:
As we have that ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ → ¬¬φ, by internalization (Corr. 1, as T CS is axiomatically appropriate) it follows, that we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS r : (φ → ¬¬φ) for some r ∈ Jt. Thus by (J) and modus ponens, we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS t : φ → [r · t] : ¬¬φ for any t ∈ Jt. Thus, we have:
• If E 0 (t, φ) = 0, then ∼ 2 E 0 (t, φ) = 0 and there is nothing to show.
• If E 0 (t, φ) = 1, then ∼ 2 E 0 (t, φ) = 1 and by definition ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ and ⊢ GJ 45T CS t : φ. Then, with ⊢ GJ 45T CS t : φ → [r · t] : ¬¬φ and ⊢ GJ 45T CS φ → ¬¬φ, by (M P ) we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ and
This is of course not so surprising as crisp Gödel-Mkrtychev models correspond to classical Mkrtychev models in the respective class, and in classical modal logic we have ¬¬ θ → ¬¬θ ≡ θ → θ which is of course classically realizable and this realization is thus valid in all crisp Gödel-Mkrtychev models.
The condition ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ is necessary, at least for axiomatically appropriate constant specifications as if ⊢ GJ 45T CS ¬¬φ, then by internalization(Corr. 1, as T CS is axiomatically appropriate), we have ⊢ GJ 45T CS s : ¬¬φ for some s ∈ Jt and then by propositional reasoning in GJ 45 T CS :
Proof. Let M = E, e ∈ GMT(or GMLP) and set N = M ∈ GM(or GM4). We show the claim by induction on L J . The propositional cases are clear, so let φ ∈ L J such that |φ| M = |φ| * N and let t ∈ Jt. We have |t :
where the third equality follows from the definition of GMT(or GMLP) which require E(t, φ) ≤ |φ| M .
Lemma 9. For every N ∈ GM(or GM4), there is a M ∈ GMT(or GMLP) such that |φ| *
Proof. Let N = E, e ∈ GM(or GM4) and define M = E ′ , e by E ′ (t, φ) = E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ| * N . Then, we first show |φ| * N = |φ| M for every φ ∈ L J by induction on L J . Again, the propositional cases are clear. So let φ satisfy the claim and t ∈ Jt. Then by definition
It remains to show that M ∈ GMT. For this, we first have
as well as
For the factivity condition, we naturally have
were the last equality follows from the before proved adequacy of M for N. If N is a GM4-model, then also E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) and therefore
where the inequality follows from the fact that E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ| * N ≤ E(!t, t : φ) as well as E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ| * N = |t : φ| * N . Naturally, in the two lemmas above, if one model respects a constant specification, the constructed equivalent respects it as well.
In the following, let GJ L 0 = GJ T 0 , GLP 0 and GMJL = GM, GM4 as well as GMJLT = GMT, GMLP respectively. Also, let CS be a constant specification for GJ L 0 .
Proof. By the standard completeness theorem, Thm. 2, we show the equivalence of |= GMJLT CS and |= * GMJL CS .
Suppose Γ |= * GMJL CS φ, i.e. for every M ∈ GMJL CS , if M |= * Γ, then M |= * φ. By Lem. 8, for every N ∈ GMJLT CS , if we have N |= Γ, then N |= φ. Thus, we have Γ |= GMJLT CS φ.
For the reverse, suppose Γ |= GMJLT CS φ, i.e. for every M ∈ GMJLT CS , if M |= Γ, then M |= φ. Again, now by Lem. 9, for every N ∈ GMJL CS , if we have N |= * Γ, then N |= * φ. Thus, we have Γ |= * GMJL CS φ.
3.2. GJ T CS and GLP CS do not realize GT and GS4 . Here, let T CS be the total constant specification for GLP 0 . Again, with x ∈ (0, 1), we define another x-rooted provability model
x , e x with e x as before and
for any t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J . As before, we get the following lemma, however now for T CS being the total constant specification for GLP 0 .
Lemma 11. For any x ∈ (0, 1), M ′ x is a GM4 TCS -model. As before, but with a slightly changed proof altered for the alternative semantics, we obtain the following lemma. Here, we have to restrict ourselves to propositional variables in L J , as in the new semantics it is relatively hard to control the truth value of compound statements containing justifications.
Lemma 12. For any p ∈ V ar and any t, s ∈ Jt:
Proof. Let p ∈ V ar and t, s ∈ Jt as well as x ∈ (0, 1). Then naturally ⊢ GLP T CS p and ⊢ GLP T CS ¬¬p. Thus, 
As before, we obtain the following two theorems.
Theorem 13. For any constant specification CS for GJ T 0 :
As before with GJ 4 0 , also GJ T CS and GLP CS do not even realize GK . But in this case, the forgetful projection of the factivity axiom scheme t : φ → φ is not a theorem of GK , i.e. again (T h GJ T CS )
•
Conclusion
We have shown that the four Gödel justification logics GJ CS , GJ T CS , GJ 4 CS , GLP CS from [16] do not realize the standard Gödel modal logics GK , GT , GK4 and GS4 from [3, 4] and by this answered one of the open problems in [8, 16] negatively. The Gödel justifications logics arise as natural generalizations of the classical cases, both in model theoretic and proof theoretic terms. Also, they are compliant with the standard Gödel modal logics via the forgetful projection. We thus advocate for the conclusion that they are not "the wrong" Gödel justification logics but that there is an effective gap between Gödel (fuzzy) justification logics and Gödel modal logics, inherent to the many-valuedness of the base logic, which is in strong contrast to the classical counterparts where the realization theorems form one of the core natural components in their relationship, even being one of the key factors of their origination.
We didn't consider the Gödel justification logics GJ 45 CS and GJ T 45 CS explicitly which contain the negative introspection axiom ¬t : φ →?t : ¬t : φ. This has multiple reasons. For one, the alternative Gödel-Mkrtychev semantics does not extend to the case of GJ T 45 CS which also has the factivity axiom t : φ → φ. This is in strong similarity to classical justification logic, see. e.g. [17] . For another, the development regarding Gödel modal logics with negative introspection mostly relies on adding the possibility-modality ♦ (see e.g. [5] ) which is also why there is no explicit statement regarding non-realization with GJ 45 CS in section 2. If one would axiomatically define GK45 (which by now seems to have been unmentioned in the literature) as the extension of GK4 by the ( -only) negative introspection axiom scheme ¬ φ → ¬ φ, we would obtain a similar forgetful projection result as in Thm. 3, and thus would get the theorem (T h GJ 45CS )
• T h GK45 . directly through Lem. 5. It shall be interesting to advance the study of Gödel modal logics and their realizations for these cases in the future.
